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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-1143 
_____________ 
 
DAVID FIELDS, 
 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PITTSBURGH, a municipal corporation;  
CHRISTOPHER GOETZ, as an individual;  
JEFFREY W. LABELLA, as an individual;  
RICHARD REILLY, as an individual; 
JOHN DOE, as an individual       
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01311) 
District Judge:  Hon. David S. Cercone 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 12, 2017 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, JORDAN, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed October 26, 2017) 
____________ 
 
OPINION  
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Plaintiff David Fields (“Fields”) appeals from the decision of the District Court 
granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Fields’ claims under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 for false arrest, Fourth Amendment excessive force, and conspiracy, and the 
District Court’s decision declining to assert supplemental jurisdiction over his state law 
claims.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm.  
I.1 
Fields is the owner of a car dealership located adjacent to a daycare center owned 
by his wife.  On July 8, 2013, Fields’ wife called the City of Pittsburgh Police to report a 
vehicle that was improperly parked in the daycare center’s loading zone, located across 
the street from the Fields’ businesses.  At the time, Fields had parked his own van on the 
sidewalk in front of their businesses to unload supplies for the daycare center.  When 
Officer Connelly arrived, he noted Fields’ van, was told that it was there to unload 
supplies, and assented to its presence so long as Fields unloaded quickly.  Defendant 
Officers Labella and Goetz then arrived on the scene and Labella told Fields that he had 
to move the van.  Fields agreed to do so, but explained that Labella would first need to 
move his cruiser, which was blocking the van.  Labella replied “you don’t tell me what to 
                                              
1 We write only for the parties and therefore recount only those facts necessary to 
our disposition.  As this appeal follows a motion for summary judgment, the Court 
recounts the facts in the light most favorable to Fields and accords him “every reasonable 
inference that can be drawn from the record.”  Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 
F.3d 782, 788 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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do” and after Fields repeated that he would move once the cruiser was moved, Labella 
replied “oh, you’re an asshole, huh?  We’ll just F’ing tow it.”  Appendix (“App.”) 3.   
Fields began recording Labella with his cellphone camera.  The video shows 
Labella returning briefly to his cruiser, then walking directly up to within a few feet of 
Fields who was standing at his van and training his camera on Labella.  Labella can be 
heard saying “you better get that camera out of my face,” at which point the video cuts 
out.  Fields asserts that Labella slapped him in the face, knocked the phone out of his 
hands, and then held him by the collar.  However, Fields explained in his deposition that 
the encounter was brief and that Labella “didn’t grab me and, like, just keep holding me . 
. . .  It was a slap, grab up, and then he let me go.”  ECF # 81-1 at 15.   
Visibly outraged by his treatment, Fields can be seen in a second video that began 
a short time later complaining to Lieutenant Reilly — who was seated in his car — that 
Labella had assaulted him.  As Reilly moved his car a few feet forward to park, Fields 
was left standing a foot or two from Labella, yelling “you assaulted me, you assaulted 
me” while gesturing towards Labella’s face.  Fields then walked towards Reilly, who was 
exiting his car; Labella followed a few feet behind Fields.  At this point, Fields was 
standing in front of Reilly, with Labella and a third officer on either side of him.  Fields 
turned towards Labella and, with his fists balled at his side, made “two quick moves” 
towards him.  App. 5.  Labella, Goetz, and the third officer then converged on Fields to 
handcuff and arrest him, and Reilly can be heard on the recording telling Fields “you 
can’t do that.”  Fields was told to put his hands behind his back, but at least initially held 
them in front of his body.  The officers succeeded in handcuffing only one of Fields’ 
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wrists and at some point Labella used a Taser on Fields, who was then pushed against a 
fence and handcuffed.  Fields was charged with two counts of aggravated assault, one 
count of obstructing the administration of law, and one count of resisting arrest; he 
pleaded guilty to reduced charges of two counts of harassment and one count of 
disorderly conduct.  Id. at 9.    
 On September 24, 2014, Fields filed suit against the City of Pittsburgh and 
Officers Labella, Goetz, Reilly, and “Doe,” asserting claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983 for 
violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights, Monell claims, and state law tort 
claims.  After the District Court denied without prejudice defendants’ partial motion to 
dismiss, defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment.  In response, Fields 
withdrew his claims against Reilly and “Doe,” as well as his First Amendment and 
Monell claims.  Id. at 1.  On December 16, 2016, the District Court granted defendants’ 
motion, finding that Fields’ false arrest claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 
477 (1994), that the officers’ conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and in any 
event that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.  Id. at 9, 14, 16.  The District 
Court declined to assert supplemental jurisdiction over Fields’ state law claims.  Fields 
timely appealed.  
II.2 
Fields challenges the District Court’s determinations that (1) because he pleaded 
guilty to various offenses arising from the incident, his false arrest claim is barred by 
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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Heck, and (2) neither Labella’s initial slap, nor the subsequent Tasing and arrest, violated 
Fields’ Fourth Amendment rights.  We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
grant of summary judgment.  Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2010). 
A. 
 To succeed on a claim of false arrest, a plaintiff must show “that the police lacked 
probable cause to arrest” him.  Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 
1995).  We have noted that “it is irrelevant to the probable cause analysis what crime a 
suspect is eventually charged with,” because “[p]robable cause need only exist as to any 
offense that could be charged under the circumstances.”  Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 
409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 
819 (3d Cir. 1994)).  Although Fields pleaded to lesser offenses than he was originally 
charged with, his guilty plea inherently included an acknowledgement that probable 
cause existed to arrest him for some offense.  In Heck, the Supreme Court ruled that “a § 
1983 action that impugns the validity of the plaintiff’s underlying conviction cannot be 
maintained unless the conviction has been reversed on direct appeal or impaired by 
collateral proceedings.”  Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 208–09 (3d Cir. 2005).  As 
applied here, Fields’ success on his false arrest claim depends on a finding that the 
officers lacked probable cause to arrest him, which would directly “impugn[] the 
validity” of his resulting guilty plea.  Because his guilty plea has not been invalidated, 
Heck bars Fields’ false arrest claim. 
 We are not persuaded by Fields’ arguments that Heck should not apply, all of 
which rely on the claim that Labella made false statements in his affidavit of probable 
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cause, and which Fields faults the District Court for ignoring.  As an initial matter, the 
District Court rejected these arguments, in part because Fields had not included a copy of 
the affidavit of probable cause in the record.  App. 11.  Fields’ counter-statement of 
material facts makes various factual allegations regarding the affidavit, but includes no 
citations to the record where the affidavit could be found.  See id. 71–72, 74–75.  Under 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c) and (e), such unsupported statements of fact need 
not be considered.  The District Court properly declined to accept as true Fields’ 
unsupported assertions regarding the affidavit.    
 Moreover, even if Fields had included the affidavit, a § 1983 claim is an improper 
vehicle for challenging the validity of his guilty plea.  Fields is limited to filing a direct 
appeal, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (which we concede is unavailable to Fields 
because he is not in custody), or another appropriate petition for post-conviction relief to 
challenge a guilty plea.3  Fields claims in this § 1983 suit that the officers improperly 
                                              
3 Fields relies upon Basile v. Twp. of Smith, 752 F. Supp. 2d 643 (W.D. Pa. 2010), 
for the proposition that where a plaintiff alleges that his guilty plea resulted from fraud, 
perjury, or other corrupt means, he may attack his plea in a § 1983 civil case (rather than 
on direct appeal or via a habeas petition), but this rule finds no support in this Court’s 
jurisprudence.  The “fraud, perjury or other corrupt means” language comes from the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which sets out the rule that a conviction, even if reversed, 
“conclusively establishes the existence of probable cause, unless the conviction was 
obtained by fraud, perjury or other corrupt means.”  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 667 
(1977).  There is no basis upon which to rely on this language to assert that a guilty plea 
that has not been reversed on appeal can be undermined in a collateral civil action by 
making such allegations.  To support its reading, the District Court in Basile relied on 
Unger v. Cohen, 718 F. Supp. 185, 187–88 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), which based its decision on 
the fact that the plaintiff there was not “in custody” and so could not seek habeas review.  
This Court, however, has held that Heck applies even in such circumstances.  See 
Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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arrested him and then manufactured the probable cause affidavit to cover it up, leading 
Fields to plead guilty to a lesser crime simply to avoid the risk of a (fraudulent) higher 
sentence.  This allegation, if proven, would imply the invalidity of Fields’ conviction, and 
so would run afoul of Heck.  Finally, that Fields chose to plead guilty because he was 
offered “a substantially reduced set of charges” is of no moment:   “[A] plea of guilty is 
not invalid merely because entered to avoid the possibility of a” higher sentence.  Brady 
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). 
B. 
  Officers who have probable cause to arrest a defendant may use force to effectuate 
the arrest, but they cannot use “excessive force.”  Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 
497, 515 (3d Cir. 2003).  The elements of “a claim for excessive force as an unreasonable 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment” are: (1) “that a ‘seizure’ occurred,” and (2) that the 
seizure “was unreasonable.”  Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 288 (3d Cir. 1999).  Where 
a plaintiff alleges multiple instances of police misconduct, a reviewing court may not 
consider the entire course of conduct at once, but rather “the objective reasonableness 
analysis must be conducted separately for each . . . seizure that is alleged to be 
unconstitutional.”  County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1547 (2017).   
 We agree with the District Court that, however objectionable, Labella’s slap and 
grab did not amount to a seizure and so Fields’ constitutional rights were not implicated 
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in the altercation.4  After he was slapped and, by his own account, briefly grabbed, Fields 
freely moved away from Labella to complain to Reilly and thus plainly did not 
understand himself to have been seized by Labella.  See Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn 
Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2005) (“A seizure occurs for Fourth 
Amendment purposes when ‘a reasonable person would have believed that he was not 
free to leave.’” (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988))). 
 Because Fields’ guilty plea establishes that the officers had probable cause to 
arrest him, the only remaining question is whether their use of a Taser to subdue him was 
objectively reasonable.  We agree with the District Court that it was.  Factors to be 
considered when assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force include the 
severity of the crime, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to public safety, and 
whether the suspect was actively resisting or evading arrest.  See Graham v. Connor, 490 
U.S. 386, 396 (1989).  Here, incident to a valid arrest supported by probable cause, the 
officers faced an individual who had just made gestures at the officers that could 
reasonably be viewed as threatening and who had resisted the officers’ attempt to 
peaceably place him under arrest.  Under the circumstances, the Tasing was reasonable 
because it was proportional to the need for force, especially in light of Fields’ active 
resistance of arrest. 
                                              
4 Nothing in our disposition of this case should be understood to imply that we take 
lightly Fields’ allegations.  Those allegations about Officer Labella’s behavior are 
serious, and certainly deserving of investigation. 
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 Fields does not address the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct at the time of 
the Tasing (after Fields made moves towards Labella and resisted arrest), but instead 
principally argues that the District Court erred by separately considering the slap and the 
Tasing, because Fields’ conduct at the end of the encounter can only be understood in 
light of Labella’s provocation at the start of the encounter.  Citing Billington v. Smith, 
292 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2002), Fields asserts that Labella’s provocation “in committing a 
battery upon the person of Mr. Fields, created an atmosphere that was so toxic that the 
violence that occurred later was an inevitable consequence.”  Fields Br. 26.  Thus, for 
instance, Fields’ analysis of the Graham factors relies upon the circumstances as they 
existed at start of the encounter, when Fields had yet to commit a crime, had not resisted 
arrest, and posed no threat to the officers.  See id. at 27.  Unsurprisingly, this analysis 
yields the conclusion that the officers acted unreasonably in Tasing a non-resisting 
individual whom they had no probable cause to arrest in the first place.  
Although the Court has little doubt that Fields’ understandable anger lingered 
throughout the encounter and played a role in his response to his arrest, the inquiry is not 
whether Fields’ actions were reasonable, but rather whether the officers’ responses were 
reasonable under the circumstances, considering the situation they were facing.  Cf. 
Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 837 F.3d 343, 353 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment “does not oblige an officer to passively endure a life-threatening 
physical assault, regardless of the assailant’s mental state”).  On that score, the Supreme 
Court has expressly rejected the “provocation” rule established in Billington, and has 
reiterated that “[a]n excessive force claim is a claim that a law enforcement officer 
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carried out an unreasonable seizure through a use of force that was not justified under the 
relevant circumstances.  It is not a claim that an officer used reasonable force after 
committing a distinct Fourth Amendment violation . . . .”  Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1547.  
Here, where Labella’s provocation was not even an independent Fourth Amendment 
violation, it cannot be used to render improper a later-in-time and otherwise valid use of 
force.   
The Supreme Court in Mendez left open the possibility that, under the Graham 
test, a court should consider “unreasonable police conduct prior to the use of force that 
foreseeably created the need to use it.”  Id. at 1547 n.*; see also Johnson, 837 F.3d at 351 
(declining to decide whether Graham’s “totality of the circumstances” test “should 
account for whether the officer’s own reckless or deliberate conduct unreasonably created 
the need to use deadly force”).  Fields, however, does not actually contend that a 
foreseeable consequence of Labella’s slap was that the officers would at some later point 
need to Tase Fields to effectuate his lawful arrest and, in any event, his threatening 
behavior towards them — which provided the officers probable cause to arrest — was a 
superseding cause that broke the chain of proximate causation between the slap and the 
Tasing.  See Johnson, 837 F.3d at 353–54 (holding that even if officer’s conduct was 
unreasonable, given the time that elapsed between the conduct and the decedent’s 
response, “no reasonable juror could conclude that [decedent’s response] was an 
involuntary or foreseeable defensive response to the” officer’s conduct); id. at 351–52 
(“Whether or not [an officer] acted unreasonably at the outset . . . Plaintiff must still 
prove that [the officer’s] allegedly unconstitutional actions proximately caused [the 
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injury].  Under ordinary tort principles, a superseding cause breaks the chain of 
proximate causation.”).  Fields has not established that his constitutional rights were 
violated,5 so his § 1983 claim fails and we need not consider the issue of qualified 
immunity.  See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 6  
III. 
We review the District Court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for 
abuse of discretion.  See Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., 584 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2009).  
After dismissing the federal claims before it, the District Court acted within its discretion 
in declining to assert supplemental jurisdiction over Fields’ state law claims.  Id. at 174. 
IV.  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
                                              
5 Because the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants on Fields’ false arrest and excessive force claims, it likewise properly 
dismissed the conspiracy claim for which those claims served as predicates.  See In re 
Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 1999). 
6 Like the District Court, we express no views on the viability of Fields’ state law 
claims, but hold only that the conduct at issue did not violate Field’s federal 
constitutional rights.  
